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Intellectual Freedom 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, the development 
of the intellect, is the emergence of increasingly 
sophisticated forms or levels of cognition, the 
progress of understanding, reasoning, and ra- 
tionality. We can describe the outcomes of in- 
tellectual development by specifying steps, 
stages, or levels of development for cognition 
as a whole and/or for various cognitive domains. 
Fundamentally, however, intellectual develop- 
ment is an ongoing process of reflection, coor- 
dination, and social interaction that begins in 
early childhood and continues, at least in some 
cases, long into adulthood. 
Liberal education, however defined, includes 
the promotion of intellectual development 
as a primary goal. There may be specific facts, 
might suffice for us to credit even the three-year- 
old mind with a theory of itself (Flavell, Miller, 
and Miller 2002). There is, to be sure, plenty of 
evidence for cognitive abilities common or uni- 
versal among college students that are rarely or 
never seen in very young children (Moshman 
1998, 1999,2003). The developmental litera- 
ture challenges us, however, to be more clear 
about just how advanced cognition differs from 
childish cognition, which apparently is not as 
childish as we thought. My response to this 
challenge, in a word, is metacognition. 
By metacognition I mean knowledge about 
cognition itself and control of one's own cogni- 
tive processes. Let me be clear: I am not sug- 
gesting that children lack metacognition or 
There may be 
specific facts, 
skills, and values 
we want students 
to learn in 
specific courses 
and contexts, 
but above all 
we want to foster 
intellectual 
progress 
in specific courses and contexts, but above all 
we want to foster intellectual progress. To en- 
courage intellectual progress, we must promote 
reflection, coordination, and social interaction, 
the basic processes of development. There are 
many ways to do this, but the fundamental 
context for all of them, I argue, is one that en- 
courages students to consider, propose, and 
discuss a variety of ideas-that is, an environ- 
ment of intellectual freedom. I conclude with 
a set of principles of academic freedom that, I 
suggest, are foundational to the promotion of 
intellectual development. 
Advanced cognition as metacognition 
If cognitive developmental theorists and re- 
searchers in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century had a motto, it was something like, 
"Anything adults can do, young children can 
do, too." Reacting to Piaget's earlier account of 
preschool children as "preoperational," develop- 
mental researchers devised ingenious ways to 
show, for example, that four-year-olds have 
"theories of mind," and theorists proceeded to 
argue with each other as to whether the tanta- 
lizing insights and skills of children not yet four 
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of conceptual knowledge about the nature 
and justification of knowledge and reasoning 
that are rarely or never seen in children. It is 
in this regard that later developing forms of 
cognition are most clearly advanced. 
From logic to metalogic 
Imagine a very young child who is presented 
with two boxes-one red and one blue-and 
is told there is a ball in one of them. Failing to 
find the ball in the red box, she immediately 
infers that it is in the blue box and looks for it 
there. We may conclude that her behavior in- 
volves a disjunctive inference of the form: p or 
q; not p; therefore, q (where p = the ball is in 
the red box, and q = the ball is in the blue box). 
To explain the fact that she routinely makes 
disjunctive inferences, we may even suggest 
that she in some sense "has" an inference 
schema of this form. However, there is no rea- 
son to assume she is aware of such a schema, 
or deliberately applies it for the purpose of 
reaching justifiable conclusions, or understands 
the logical necessity associated with deductive 
conclusions. Explicit understanding of the 
logic of disjunction exists only in the mind of 
the psychologist who is explaining her behav- 
ior. The child herself is probably not even 
aware that she has made an inference. 
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Consider now the following arguments, each 
consisting of two premises and a conclusion: 
1. Elephants are plants or animals. 
Elephants are not plants. 
Therefore, elephants are animals. 
2. Elephants are animals or plants. 
Elephants are not animals. 
Therefore, elephants are plants. 
Even a young child would readily endorse 
the first argument as logical. Children as old 
as age nine or ten, however, reject arguments 
such as #2 as illogical. Most adolescents and 
adults, on the other hand, especially given 
sufficient opportunity to consider their re- 
sponses, recognize in cases of this sort that the 
two arguments have the same logical form and 
are both ualid. The second argument has a false 
second premise and a false conclusion, which 
is why children reject it, but it is nonetheless 
a valid argument in that the conclusion nec- 
essarily follows from the two premises. If the 
premises were true, the conclusion would nec- 
essarily be true as well. 
This age difference, it should be emphasized, 
does not reflect an inability of children to 
make disjunctive inferences. As we saw in the 
first example, very young children routinely 
make instantaneous disjunctive inferences 
without even realizing they have done so. But 
that's precisely the problem. Lacking awareness 
of inference, they cannot explicitly evaluate 
arguments. Only as they approach adoles- 
cence do they sufficiently distinguish form 
from content to be able to recognize valid in- 
ference even in the case of arguments con- 
taining (what they deem to be) false premises 
and/or a false conclusion. What develops in 
the domain of logical reasoning, then, is not 
the basic ability to make logical inferences but 
the level of metalogical understanding about 
such inferences. 
Psychological research indicates that meta- 
logical understanding first appears about age 
six and continues to develop for many years. 
Its development involves processes of reflect- 
ing on one's inferences, coordinating them 
with each other, and interacting with other 
thinkers. Beginning about age eleven, it be- 
comes possible to recognize and evaluate the 
logical interconnections among propositions 
that are hypothetical or even false. As a result, 
adolescents and adults are able, albeit incon- 
sistently and to varying degrees, to consider 
the potential interrelations of multiple possi- 
bilities and thus to formulate and test explicit 
theories (for classic research and theory on 
"formal operations," Piaget's highest stage, see 
Inhelder and Piaget 1958; for recent reviews, 
see Moshman 1998,1999). 
The promotion of logical reasoning, then, 
should be aimed not at the implantation of 
correct inference schemas but rather at foster- 
ing metalogical understanding concerning the 
nature of logical argumentation and the justi- 
fication of its results. Metalogical understand- 
ing can be promoted by encouraging reflec- 
tion on and coordination of inferences and 
providing opportunities for collaborative rea- 
soning among peers. 
Advanced metacognition 
A t  advanced levels, metacognitive develop- 
ment involves the development of explicit 
understanding about the fundamental nature 
and justifiability of knowledge and reasoning. 
These are matters of what philosophers call 
epistemology, the study of knowledge. Research 
indicates that such understanding-what psy- 
chologists call epistemic cognition-often con- 
tinues to  develop long beyond childhood, but 
that the extent of development is highly vari- 
able across individuals. Specifically, develop- 
ment may proceed from an objectivist episte- 
mology to a subjectivist epistemology, and 
ultimately, in some cases, to a rationalist episte- 
mology (for reviews, see Hofer and Pintrich 
2002; King and Kitchener 1994). Each episte- 
mology is constructed from earlier concep- 
tions through processes of reflection and coor- 
dination, often in the context of social, and 
especially peer, interaction. 
Consider the following claims: 
1. Whales are bigger than germs. 
2 . 5 + 3 = 8 .  
3. Chocolate is better than vanilla. 
4. Einstein's theory is better than Newton's. 
5. Mozart's music is better than Madonna's. 
Which of these claims are true, and how can 
such judgments be justified? How would ob- 
jectivists, subjectivists, and rationalists, re- 
spectively, respond to such questions? 
A n  objectivist, who sees truth as unproblem- 
atic, would see the first two claims as proto- 
typical examples of knowledge. It can readily 
be established that each of these claims is true 
and that alternative claims, such as germs are 
bigger than whales or 5 + 3 = 12, are false. Claim 
4 may be a more difficult matter because it in- 
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volves technical knowledge, but an objectivist 
would maintain that this claim too is either true 
or false. If scientists determine that Einstein's 
theory is consistent with relevant evidence 
and Newton's theory is not, then Claim 4 is 
true. Claim 3 might be dismissed as a matter 
of opinion, not a matter of knowledge. Claim 
5 might also be simply a matter of opinion, 
though perhaps an  expert in music could es- 
tablish its truth. 
For the objectivist, then, truth and falsity 
are sharply distinct. True beliefs can be defini- 
tively distinguished from false beliefs on  the 
basis of logic and evidence. Irreconcilable dif- 
ferences can only exist with regard to matters 
of opinion, which are sharply distinct from 
matters of fact and thus fall outside the do- 
main of knowledge. And this dualistic con- 
ception, from its own point of view, is not just 
a point of view; it is the truth about truth. 
Objectivity may come into question, how- 
ever, among objectivists faced with substantive 
disagreements on important issues, especially 
if the disagreements represent divergent view- 
points that do not seem reconcilable through 
the use of logic, evidence, universal moral rules, 
etc. Recognizing and reflecting on their subjec- 
tivity, objectivists may increasingly understand 
that their objectivity is not as great as they 
thought, that subjective perspectives are the 
primary reality and cannot be transcended 
through the use of logic or any other general 
system of absolute rules. Reasons, they might 
come to believe, are always relative to particu- 
lar perspectives. Justification, then, is only 
possible within specific contexts. Thus can an 
objectivist become subjectivist. 
The subjectiuist, who sees truth as relative 
to one's point of view, would see Claim 3 as a 
prototypical example of the relativity of be- 
liefs. No flavor is intrinsically better than any 
other-flavor preferences are literally a mat- 
ter of taste. But isn't everything, at least 
metaphorically, a matter of taste? I may prefer 
Mozart's music to Madonna's (Claim 5), but 
you may prefer Madonna's music to Mozart's. 
I may find a musicologist who believes Mozart's 
music is superior to that of Madonna, but 
even this so-called expert, the subjectivist 
would argue, evaluates music from his or her 
own musical perspective, which is no better 
than anyone else's perspective. Similarly, it 
may be true that most contemporary physi- 
cists prefer Einstein's theory to Newton's 
(Claim 4), but there was a time when New- 




time when Einstein's theory falls into disfavor. 
Even in science, the subjectivist would point 
out, our "facts" are a function of our theoretical 
perspectives, and such perspectives are ulti- 
mately subjective, neither true nor false. 
But what about Claims 1 and 2, which seem 
beyond dispute? Knowledge is rarely this simple, 
a subjectivist may respond. Even in these cases, 
moreover, the claims are true only within a 
shared network of concepts. If we think of an 
enormous cloud of pollution as a "germ," then 
germs can be larger than whales. If we reason 
in base 6, then "12" means 6 + 2 and is the 
sum of 5 and 3. For the subjectivist, then, 
judgments of truth and falsity are always a 
function of one's perspective, and no  perspec- 
tive is better or worse than any other. In the 
end, everything turns out to be simply a matter 
of opinion. 
The  core problem with subjectivism as an 
epistemology is that, in its strong versions, it 
undermines its own claim to justification. If no 
view is justifiable, except from some perspective 
that is no  better than any other perspective, 
then there is no reason to adopt or maintain a 
subjectivist view, except from a subjectivist 
perspective, which is no  better than any other 
perspective. 
A t  a more practical level, moreover, radical 
subjectivism provides no  basis for choosing any 
course of action over any other, and thus pro- 
vides no  guidance for living one's life. These 
problems may arise in myriad forms as subjec- 
tivists encounter a variety of challenges and 
find themselves applying and defending a view 
that denies any justification for anything, in- 
cluding itself. This may have serious emotional 
consequences. Some subjectivists, however, find 
a way out of what initially seems an epistemic 
dead end. Reflection on  the self-refuting na- 
ture of radical subjectivism and a new coordi- 
nation of subjectivity and objectivity may 
enable the subjectivist to  construct a rational- 
ist epistemology. 
A rationalist might take Claim 4 as a proto- 
typical example of knowledge. Einstein's the- 
ory may not be true in the same simple sense 
that whales are bigger than germs or 5 + 3 = 8, 
but preferring it to  Newton's theory is not just 
a matter of taste, like preferring one flavor to 
another. In complex domains of knowledge we 
may use justifiable criteria to evaluate various 
judgments and justifications. The  criteria are 
not absolute-they are not beyond criticism- 
but neither are they arbitrary, or specific to ar- 
bitrary perspectives. As a result, we may have 
good reason to prefer some beliefs to  others 
even if we cannot prove any of those beliefs 
true or false. It may not be clear how musical 
preferences such as Claim 5 can be justified- 
if they can be justified at all-but this doesn't 
mean all knowledge is entirely subjective any 
more than the existence of some relatively 
clear-cut truths-such as Claims 1 and 2- 
means that knowledge is intrinsically objective. 
In sum, epistemic cognition, reflective 
knowledge about the nature and justifiability 
of knowledge and reasoning, is an advanced 
form of metacognition. Research and theory 
in developmental psychology converge on the 
view that epistemic cognition initially appears 
as an objectivist epistemology, which may last 
indefinitely. Some individuals in some social 
contexts, however, construct subjectivist epis- 
temologies, and some of these go on to construct 
rationalist epistemologies. Thus, epistemic de- 
velopment is common in the college years and 
beyond but is not inevitable and is not closely 
tied to age. 
The process of development 
Epistemic cognition includes metalogical un- 
derstanding but also knowledge about modes 
of justification more subtle than the formal 
rules of logic. Advanced cognitive development, 
moreover, also includes the development of 
principled moralities, explicit self-conceptions, 
and critical dispositions (Moshman 1999, 
2003, in press). Three interrelated construc- 
tive processes are central to such development 
(Moshman 1999). 
First, intellectual development proceeds 
through processes of refiction. Reflecting on 
our inferences, we construct increasingly so- 
phisticated metalogical knowledge about the 
nature of inference, argument, and logic. Re- 
flecting on diverse perspectives, we construct 
subjectivist epistemologies. Reflecting on the 
paradoxes of subjectivism, we may, or may not, 
find ways to overcome them. Reflecting on our 
interactions with others, we construct increas- 
ingly sophisticated moralities and identities. 
Second, intricately interrelated with reflec- 
tion are processes of coordination. Reflection on 
multiple points of view may enable us to coor- 
dinate them in such a way as to construct a 
higher-level view that transcends each. A t  the 
same time, the need to coordinate perspectives 
Principles of Academic Freedom 
1. Freedom of Beliefand Identity. All persons, in- 4. Freedom from Indoctrination. Educators and 
cluding students and teachers, have an ulti- educational institutions must not require or 
mate right to believe and value whatever they coerce students to modify their beliefs or 
believe and value, to maintain or change their values. Efforts to convince students to mod- 
beliefs and values as they choose, and to de- ify their beliefs or values must be academi- 
fine themselves in terms of whatever beliefs cally justifiable. 
and values they deem central to their identi- 4A. Formulation of Curriculum. Curriculum 
ties. Educational institutions may present must be determined by teachers and other 
alternative views and values, but may not im- professionals on the basis of academic 
pose or require belief or commitment. Stu- considerations. It is a responsibility of ad- 
dents may be evaluated and graded with re- ministrators and governing boards to ex- 
gard to their understanding of and reasoning plain and support justifiable curricular 
about curricular material but not on the basis decisions and to educate their constituen- 
of their agreement with particular viewpoints. cies about the educational importance of 
Teachers and researchers may be evaluated on an inclusive curriculum and the critical 
the quality of their teaching and research, but role of respect for academic freedom. 
not on the basis of their viewpoints. 4B. Challenges to the Curriculum. Sug- 
gested modifications of the curriculum 
2. Freedmn of Expression and Discussion. All per- should not be accepted merely to resolve 
sons have a right to express their views and to a complaint, but neither should such 
discuss them with others. In academic con- suggestions automatically be rejected as 
texts, students and teachers have a right to illegitimate. In general, changes that ex- 
express their views on any matter relevant to pand the curriculum are more likely to 
the curriculum even if those views are be defensible than changes that contract 
deemed to be false, absurd, offensive, danger- or restrict it. On the other hand, addi- 
ous, or otherwise objectionable. Evaluations tions may be illegitimate if what is added 
of student and faculty work, and restrictions cannot be justified academically, and 
on the time, place, or manner of expression, deletions may be appropriate if what is 
must be neutral with respect to viewpoint. deleted was not academically justifiahle. 
Special steps to avoid misunderstandings may 
be necessary when an individual is speaking 5. Equality, Privacy, and Due Process. To  the 
in an official capacity on behalf of an educa- extent that violations of equal opportunity, 
tional institution or professional organization privacy, and due process infringe on intellec- 
or is addressing an audience that may fail to tual freedom in academic contexts, they are 
distinguish the individual from the institu- inconsistent with academic freedom. 
tion, organization, or discipline that she or he 5A. Equality. All students and faculty have 
appears to represent. an equal right to academic freedom. 
5B. Privacy. Educators and educational insti- 
3. Freedom of Inquiry. Educational institutions tutions must refrain from academically 
should encourage students and faculty to unjustified inquiries into the beliefs, val- 
pursue their own interests and ideas and ues, interests, affiliations, and expressive 
should promote access to relevant sources of activities of current and potential stu- 
information. Inquiry must not be suppressed dents and faculty and from academically 
by restricting access to particular authors, unjustified uses of information about in- 
topics, viewpoints, or sources of information, dividuals' beliefs, values, interests, affilia- 
or by hindering the formulation of objec- tions, and expressive activities. 
tionable conclusions. 5C. Due Process. Academic institutions 
must ensure that their formal and infor- 
mal procedures provide sufficient due 
process to protect intellectual freedom. 
A n  earlier version of these Principles was adopted by the Academic Freedom Coalition of Nebraska in Sep- 
tember 1999 (available at www.AFCONebr.org). 
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may be what motivates reflection, and the 
process of coordination may be simultane- 
ously a process of reflection. 
Finally, reflection and coordination often 
take place in the course of social interaction, es- 
pecially peer interaction. Interacting with oth- 
ers routinely brings multiple perspectives into 
play, and thus demands coordination and re- 
flection. This is especially so when alternative 
views come neither from a superior, whose views 
one might simply accept, nor from an inferior, 
whose views one might simply reject, but 
rather from an equal, whose views must be se- 
riously considered and, perhaps, coordinated 
with one's own. Reflection, coordination, 
and social interaction, then, are not distinct 
processes but three aspects of the process of 
autonomous agents constructing advanced 
forms of knowledge and reasoning. 
The promotion of development 
A liberal education, presumably, aims to pro- 
mote intellectual development. Psychological 
theory and research indicate that this can be 
done by encouraging and facilitating construc- 
tive processes of reflection, coordination, and 
social interaction. Such processes are not things 
that happen to an object but are the free actions 
of developing subjects and agents. Thus intel- 
lectual development requires an environment 
in which students freely access, formulate, ex- 
press, discuss, defend, refine, coordinate, and 
reconsider various ideas and perspectives. In 
other words, intellectual development requires 
a context of intellectual freedom. 
Given the centrality of intellectual freedom 
for development and education, we might de- 
fine academic freedom as intellectual freedom 
in educational and research contexts (Mosh- 
man 2002). Academic freedom, in this view, is 
a condition for education, especially if we con- 
strue education as the promotion of intellec- 
tual development. To educate students we must 
respect their autonomy and the autonomy of 
those who teach them (Moshman 1994). 
With these considerations in mind, I have 
been developing a set of principles designed to 
further education via intellectual freedom (see 
sidebar). These principles are generally consis- 
tent with those of the American Association 
of University Professors (AAUP) ( 1940/200 1) 
but apply to students and faculty at all levels 
of education. The principles owe much to 
First Amendment case law but they are not a 
summary of legal rights. Drawing on AAUP 
standards, First Amendment law, and devel- 
opmental theory, the proposed principles re- 
spect the autonomy of students and teachers 
and promote constructive processes of reflec- 
tion, coordination, and social interaction. 
Commitment to such principles and processes 
is a commitment to intellectual development. 
To  respond to this article, e-mi l :  
liberaled@aacu.org, with the author's name on 
the subject line. 
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